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License Error 0x80092013

Error 0x80092013: revocation checking fails because the CRL is unreachable

10 min read Updated October 5, 2026 Windows Server: AD, DNS & Group Policy

Fix it now

0x80092013 is CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE: the revocation function could not check revocation because the revocation server was offline. The certificate may be perfectly good. What failed is the path from this machine to whatever publishes your revocation data, and that path is what to repair.

Run these on the machine that is failing the check, in an elevated Command Prompt

certutil -verify -urlfetch certificate.cer
certutil -URL certificate.cer
certutil -urlcache * delete
  1. Read the CDP and AIA results in the -verify -urlfetch output. That switch retrieves and verifies the AIA certificates and CDP CRLs, so the failure is named against a specific URL rather than in the abstract.
  2. certutil -URL certificate.cer opens a dialog that fetches each URL on demand, which is the fastest way to separate a bad URL from a blocked path.
  3. If the published CRL has expired, republish it from the issuing CA with certutil -CRL, and copy the file to every publication point where publishing is manual.
  4. If the CRL is current but the URL is unreachable, correct the distribution points in the CA’s properties, on the Extensions tab, and reissue affected certificates as they renew.
  5. Clear the local cache with certutil -urlcache * delete so the machine stops answering from a stale copy. Note that the cache is per user, so run it in the context that is failing.

Do not switch revocation checking off to make this go away. It removes the only mechanism you have for withdrawing a certificate before it expires.

If the verify output fetches everything cleanly, you are done. The next section covers how a chain is actually checked and where the URLs come from.

Why it happens

Every certificate carries the addresses of the things needed to validate it. The CRL distribution point tells a verifier where to fetch the issuer’s revocation list; the authority information access extension tells it where to fetch the issuing certificate itself. Those addresses are baked into each certificate at issue time, which is the single most important fact here: correcting them on the CA fixes future certificates, not the ones already deployed.

When the verifier cannot fetch the list, it does not assume the certificate is good. It returns CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE – the revocation status could not be checked because the revocation server was offline – and whatever depends on the check fails closed. That is why a firewall change, an expired CRL or a decommissioned web server produces authentication failures in applications that have nothing obviously to do with certificates.

A CRL also expires. The issuing CA publishes a new one on a schedule, and if publication stops – the CA is offline, a scheduled task fails, someone forgot to copy the file from an offline root – every verifier eventually reaches the end of the current list’s validity and starts failing. Nothing changes on the client at that moment, which is why these faults appear to arrive out of nowhere.

The published CRL has expired

You have this one if The verify output fetches the CRL but reports it as expired, or the next update date is in the past.

  1. On the issuing CA, publish a new list: certutil -CRL.
  2. Where publication is manual – typically for an offline root – copy the new file to every publication point named in the certificates.
  3. Re-run certutil -verify -urlfetch and confirm the fetched list is current.

Set a calendar reminder for the offline root’s CRL. Its validity is usually measured in months, which is exactly long enough for everyone to forget.

The distribution point is unreachable from this machine

You have this one if certutil -URL cannot retrieve from an address that works elsewhere, or works from the server and not from the client subnet.

  1. Test the URL from the failing machine and from the failing account – HTTP CDP URLs are fetched by the verifying process, not by an administrator.
  2. Check proxy configuration for the account that is failing, since a service account often has no proxy settings at all.
  3. Open the path, or move publication to somewhere every verifier can reach.

The certificate names a URL that no longer exists

You have this one if The address in the certificate points at a decommissioned server or an old namespace.

  1. Correct the CDP and AIA extensions on the CA, on the Extensions tab of its properties, so that new certificates carry usable addresses.
  2. Accept that existing certificates keep the old addresses until they are reissued – either keep the old name resolvable, or reissue.
  3. Prefer an HTTP address that will outlive the server, published behind a name you control.

The machine is answering from a stale cache

You have this one if The URL works when tested by hand, and validation keeps failing for the same account.

  1. Clear the cache: certutil -urlcache * delete, run in the context of the account that is failing.
  2. Retry the operation and re-run the verify to confirm a fresh fetch.
  3. If it recurs, look for the reason the cached copy was bad in the first place rather than clearing it on a schedule.

Full reference

The codes you will see alongside this one

Code What it points at
0x80092013 CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE: the revocation function could not check revocation because the revocation server was offline
0x800B010A A chain that did not end at a root this machine trusts. Microsoft’s protocol documentation lists this value as CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT, a chain processed but terminated in an untrusted root
0x80092012 CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK: the revocation status of the certificate could not be verified
0x80092011 CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL: no function was found to verify revocation
Event ID 53 On the CA: Active Directory Certificate Services denied a request, naming the request ID, the template and the error code behind the denial

0x800B010A and its neighbours describe a trust problem rather than a reachability one. If the chain does not end at a trusted root, fetching the CRL was never going to help: publish the issuing and root CA certificates where the verifier can get them, and make sure the root is trusted.

Reading a certutil verify output

  1. Find the CDP section. Each entry is tried in order, and the output says whether the fetch succeeded and how long it took.
  2. Find the AIA section. A failure here means the verifier could not build the chain, which is a different fault from a failed revocation fetch.
  3. Look for the CRL’s ThisUpdate and NextUpdate values in the retrieved list. A NextUpdate in the past is your answer.
  4. Look for a delta CRL if the CA publishes one, because an expired delta fails the check even when the base list is current.
  5. Note which URL failed, not just that one did. The fix for an LDAP URL and an HTTP URL are different.

Where to publish, and in what order

  • List an HTTP address first for anything that non-domain machines will validate. LDAP addresses are useless outside the forest.
  • Keep the HTTP address on a name you control and can move – a certificate carries the address for its whole life.
  • Publish the root CA’s CRL somewhere reachable even though it changes rarely. That is the one nobody notices until it expires.
  • If you run an Online Responder, remember its own certificate has to be valid and trusted, or the responder becomes another thing that fails closed.

What not to do when a chain will not validate

Disabling revocation checking on the verifying machine makes the error disappear and removes the ability to withdraw a compromised certificate before it expires. It also tends to be set once and never reviewed. If you need an emergency measure while the publication point is repaired, prefer clearing the cache and correcting the URL, and treat any change that weakens checking as something with a ticket and an end date.

Confirming from the CA side

Where an enrolment or a validation is refused, the CA writes Event ID 53 naming the request and the code that caused the denial. That is the cleanest way to tie a client-side failure to a specific request on the CA: match the request ID, read the code in the event, and you have the vendor’s own statement of what the CA decided rather than an inference from the client’s error.

When a licence is the actual fix

Nothing in this article is a licensing problem. Republishing a CRL, correcting a distribution point and clearing a cache are all free, and they are the fix in almost every case. The only place a purchase enters is when the machine that publishes your revocation data – a web server hosting the CDP, or the issuing CA itself – is running a Windows Server build that no longer receives updates, in which case the honest answer is that the platform needs replacing rather than patching around. Arco supplies Windows Server 2025 Standard with the client access licences that go with it, and the Online Responder role is part of the server rather than a separate purchase. If your CA and publication points are on supported builds, fix the path and buy nothing.

Every code this article covers

Code What it points at Source
0x80092013 CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE: the revocation function could not check revocation because the revocation server was offline Microsoft Learn
0x800B010A A chain that was processed but did not end at a root the machine trusts. Microsoft’s protocol documentation lists this value as CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT Microsoft Learn
Event ID 53 Logged by CertificationAuthority: Active Directory Certificate Services denied a request, naming the request ID, the template and the error code behind the denial Microsoft Learn

Confirm the fix worked

  1. certutil -verify -urlfetch retrieves every CDP and AIA URL without error.
  2. The retrieved CRL has a NextUpdate date in the future, and so does any delta CRL.
  3. The failing application authenticates or connects again from the machine that was failing.
  4. The check passes in the context that was failing, not only as an administrator.
  5. No new Event ID 53 on the CA for those requests.

Questions people ask about this

Does this mean my certificate was revoked?

No. It means the revocation status could not be determined because the revocation source could not be reached. Revocation itself is a different code.

Can I turn off revocation checking?

You can, and you should not. It removes the only mechanism for withdrawing a certificate before it expires, and it is invariably still switched off years later.

I fixed the CDP on the CA and existing certificates still fail.

The addresses are written into each certificate when it is issued. Correcting the CA fixes new certificates; existing ones keep the old addresses until they are reissued, so keep the old address resolvable in the meantime.

Why does it work for me and not for the service?

The URL cache and any proxy configuration are per user. Test in the context that is failing, and clear the cache in that context with certutil -urlcache * delete.

How long can an offline root’s CRL be valid?

Long enough that everyone forgets it exists, which is the whole problem. Whatever period you choose, put the republication date in a calendar that outlives the person who set it up.

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