Fix it now
This is a service ticket failure, not a logon failure. While processing a TGS request for the target server named in the event, the KDC found the named account had no key of any encryption type the client asked for. The account to fix is the service or computer account that owns the name, not the user who was signing in.
klist get HOST/app.contoso.com
Get-ADObject -Filter 'Name -eq "APP01"' -Properties msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes |
Format-List Name,DistinguishedName,msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes
- Read the event properly: %1 is the target server, %2 is the account with no suitable key, and the text prints the etypes requested and the etypes the account has.
- Set the account’s supported encryption types to include AES – 24 (0x18) is AES 128 plus AES 256 – on the service or computer account named in the event.
- Reset that account’s password so the AES keys are actually generated. Event ID 16, the sibling event, says this in its own text: changing or resetting the password will generate a proper key.
- Trigger access to the service again and open Event ID 4769 on the domain controller. Its Ticket Encryption Type should now read 0x11 or 0x12 rather than 0x17.
Do not use Event ID 4768 to check this. 4768 is the TGT request, and its encryption type reflects the krbtgt key, so it can read AES while the account you just fixed still has no usable key.
If 4769 shows an AES ticket encryption type and the application works, you are done. The next section explains where the keys come from and why RC4 is no longer a place to retreat to.
Why it happens
Event ID 27 comes from the Kerberos Key Distribution Center and its symbolic name is KDCEVENT_UNSUPPORTED_ETYPE_REQUEST_TGS. The published text is: while processing a TGS request for the target server %1, the account %2 did not have a suitable key for generating a Kerberos ticket, followed by the missing key’s ID, the requested etypes and the account’s available etypes. Every part of that matters. TGS means the service ticket stage, so a user can sign in perfectly and still hit this the moment they open the application.
Event ID 16 is the same stage with a different reason. It is KDCEVENT_NO_KEY_INTERSECTION_TGS: no encryption type in common between what was requested and what the account holds, and its text adds the remedy directly, that changing or resetting the password of the named account will generate a proper key. The initial-logon equivalent of these is Event ID 14, so if you are looking at an AS-stage failure you are in the wrong article.
What an account can do is decided by msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes on the object, and this is where the common misreading lives. Microsoft’s mapping table gives a value of 0, or not defined, as defaulting to RC4_HMAC_MD5: where the attribute is absent the KDC applies DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes from the domain controllers instead. An unset attribute does not quietly mean AES. Setting the attribute alone is also not enough – the keys are generated when the password changes.
The service account has no AES key
You have this one if The event names a service or computer account, and the available etypes it prints do not include 17 or 18.
- Set msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes on that account to 24 (0x18) for AES 128 and AES 256.
- Reset the account’s password. Without that step the attribute changes and the keys do not.
- Confirm with Event ID 4769 that the issued service ticket now uses 0x11 or 0x12.
For accounts created a long time ago, the password reset is the whole fix: it is what generates modern keys.
The account is relying on a default that no longer includes RC4
You have this one if The account has no explicit msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes value, and the failures started after a round of domain controller updates.
- Set the value explicitly on the account rather than depending on the domain default.
- Where a fleet of accounts is affected, decide deliberately whether to set DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes on the domain controllers, remembering it changes behaviour for every account without an explicit value.
- Reset passwords afterwards so the keys exist.
A non-Microsoft Kerberos client is asking for an etype the account no longer holds
You have this one if Only one application or platform fails, and the requested etypes in the event are a short list such as RC4 alone.
- Read the requested etypes in the event: they tell you what the client asked for, which is often hard-coded.
- Configure the client to request AES if it can, which is the durable answer.
- If it genuinely cannot, the exception has to be explicit on the target account – and it is an exception with an expiry date, not a configuration.
The host at one end is too old to speak AES at all
You have this one if The device is legacy, and no configuration on the account changes the requested etype list.
- Check what the platform supports. The last version of Windows that did not support AES-SHA1 was Windows Server 2003, which is long out of support.
- Replace or upgrade the host. There is no supported configuration that makes a modern domain issue tickets an AES-incapable host can use indefinitely.
- Track the account until it stops appearing in these events.
Full reference
Which event belongs to which stage
| Event ID | Stage | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| 14 | AS – initial ticket | No key intersection when issuing the initial ticket. This is the logon-stage equivalent |
| 16 | TGS – service ticket | No key intersection for the target account, with the message that resetting its password will generate a proper key |
| 27 | TGS – service ticket | The account had no suitable key for the etypes requested by the client |
| Security event | What it records | When to read it |
|---|---|---|
| 4768 | A Kerberos TGT was requested | AS-stage problems only. Its ticket encryption type reflects the krbtgt key |
| 4769 | A Kerberos service ticket was requested | This one. Its ticket encryption type reflects the service account’s key, and its failure code shows 0xE |
| 4771 | Kerberos pre-authentication failed | Password and account-state failures, not encryption type failures |
Reading the numbers in the event
| Value | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 0x0 / not defined | Defaults to RC4_HMAC_MD5; the KDC falls back to DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes |
| 0x4 (4) | RC4 |
| 0x8 (8) | AES 128 |
| 0x10 (16) | AES 256 |
| 0x18 (24) | AES 128 and AES 256 |
| 0x1C (28) | RC4, AES 128 and AES 256 |
Ticket encryption types in Events 4768 and 4769 use a different scale: 0x11 is AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96, 0x12 is AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96, and 0x17 is RC4-HMAC. A 4769 showing 0x17 after you thought you had moved to AES is the clearest evidence you have not.
Confirming it from the client instead
Rather than waiting for a user, ask for the ticket directly: klist get HOST/<fqdn>. Where there is no common encryption type, this returns 0x80090342 with the message that the encryption type requested is not supported by the KDC, which is the client-side face of the same failure. The matching Event 4769 on the domain controller carries failure code 0xE, KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOTSUPP.
Why RC4 is not a place to retreat to any more
- Windows Server 2025 domain controllers do not issue RC4 ticket granting tickets. You can still authenticate to a legacy device with RC4, but the legacy device cannot authenticate using Kerberos.
- Updates released on or after 14 April 2026 changed the default value of DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes to AES-SHA1 only, 0x18, so accounts that relied on the old default lost RC4 without anyone changing a setting.
- The July 2026 updates removed support for the RC4DefaultDisablementPhase registry subkey, so the temporary rollback that existed during the transition is gone.
- Where RC4 is genuinely still needed, it has to be explicit: an RC4 bit in msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes on the individual account, or a deliberate DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes value.
- The KDC now warns about these configurations in its own events – 201 to 204 for clients and services that can only use RC4, and 205 where DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes is configured insecurely.
Auditing before you change anything
Microsoft publishes two scripts for this, List-AccountKeys.ps1 and Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1, which read the 4768 and 4769 events and enumerate the keys accounts hold and the encryption types actually in use. On a domain of any size that is a better starting point than fixing accounts one event at a time, because it tells you how many accounts are one update away from this error.
When a licence is the actual fix
Most of this is free: an attribute, a password reset, and an audit pass. The case where it is not is a host that cannot speak AES at all. Microsoft’s position is that the last version of Windows without AES-SHA1 support was Windows Server 2003, and on Windows Server 2025 domain controllers RC4 ticket granting tickets are not issued, so a machine that can only do RC4 or DES is at the end of a road rather than in need of configuration. Where that machine is a Windows server, replacing it is the fix and Arco supplies Windows Server 2025 Standard with the client access licences to match. Check first: if the host is supported and simply has no AES key, set the attribute, reset the password and spend nothing.
Every code this article covers
| Code | What it points at | Source |
|---|---|---|
Event ID 27 |
While processing a service ticket request for the named target server, the account had no suitable key for the encryption types the client requested | Microsoft Learn |
0xE |
KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOTSUPP: the KDC has no support for the encryption type. Seen in the Failure Code field of Event 4769 | Microsoft Learn |
Event ID 16 |
The no-key-intersection form of the same service ticket failure; its text says that changing or resetting the named account’s password will generate a proper key | Microsoft Learn |
Event ID 4769 |
A Kerberos service ticket was requested. This is the Security log record that corresponds to events 16 and 27 | Microsoft Learn |
Event ID 4768 |
A Kerberos ticket granting ticket was requested. It belongs to the initial logon stage, so it is the wrong event for checking this fix | Microsoft Learn |
Confirm the fix worked
- Event ID 4769 for the affected service shows a Ticket Encryption Type of 0x11 or 0x12, not 0x17.
klist get <service>/<fqdn>from an affected client returns a ticket rather than 0x80090342.- No new Event 27 or Event 16 on the domain controllers naming that account.
- The account’s msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes holds the value you set, and its password has been reset since.
- No KDC event 205 warning about an insecure DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes value.
Questions people ask about this
Which account do I fix – the user or the server?
The account named in the event, which at the TGS stage is the service or computer account that owns the service principal name. The user who was signing in is not the problem.
Is Event 16 the logon-stage version of Event 27?
No. Both are service ticket events. Event 16 is the no-key-intersection form and Event 27 the unsupported-etype-requested form. The initial-logon equivalent is Event ID 14.
I set msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes and nothing changed.
Reset the account’s password. The attribute says what the account advertises; the keys themselves are generated at password change.
Can I turn RC4 back on until we are ready?
Not by the encryption types policy alone, and not indefinitely. Windows Server 2025 domain controllers do not issue RC4 TGTs, the April 2026 updates made AES-SHA1 the default for accounts without an explicit value, and the July 2026 updates removed the rollback subkey. Any RC4 you keep has to be explicit on the account.
Why does 4768 show AES when the ticket still fails?
Because 4768 is the TGT, which is encrypted with the krbtgt key. It tells you nothing about whether the service account has a usable key. Read 4769.
